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"ORIGINALIST" VALUES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
RICHARD

S.

KAY*

"Originalism" is of too recent vintage to permit a meaningful
discussion about its "true" definition. It has been used to describe a method of adjudication that has been roughly identified
and debated by academic commentators on American constitutional law in the last twenty or so years.' Advocates of this method
have typically been reacting to a practice of adjudication in
which the Constitution has been invoked, but the actual bases of
decision appear to be broad standards of governmental conduct,
standards whose association with the constitutional text is, at
least, problematic.2
It is not obvious, however, what it means to be faithful to the
original text of the Constitution. And the writings of those who
might be called originalists (those who think that courts should
make constitutional decisions exclusively in a manner called for
in some way by the Constitution itself)' have not been entirely
consistent. Still, two central values seem to underlie most
originalists' positions.
The first is the value of certainty: that public power should be
limited by rules of law that are abstract, a priori, knowable, and
fixed-the value of "the rule of law."4 The second is the value of
legitimacy. This is a political value: it demands that binding rules,
and especially the rules about the extent of public power, should
* William J. Brennan Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. See, eg., lcHmAELJ. PEmta, THE CONsTrrION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR PoLrncs? 8-9,
28-53 (1994); Paul Brest. The Misconceived Qest for the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L.
REv.204,204-05 (1980); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scipture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1,

1-2 (1984).
2. See RAotn BERGER, GovERNmENr ByJuncmim THE TRANsFOImAToN OF THE FOURaErEH Am .NMEr 2-4 (1977); ROBERT H. BoM, THE TEmPTING OF AMERiCA: THE PoLrrIcA. SEnUroN OF raE LAw 72-74, 95-100, 143 (1990); EARL M. MALTZ, RETHININmG
CoNsr-rmoNA. LA-w OwGINALIsM, INTERvENTIONmsM, AND THE PoLrrcs OF JuDcmia. REvrzv 50-64 (1994); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the OriginalIntentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and Responses; 82 Nw. U. L. REV.226, 226-28 (1988).
3. I exclude from this category writers who think that the text and original meaning of
the Constitution, however defined, play merely a supplementary or advisory role in the
decision making process. Thus, Michael Perry may properly claim to be writing as an
originalist, see PEmR, supranote 1, at 29-30, and Richard Fallon may not. See Richard H.
Fallon,Jr., A ConstructivistCoherenc Theoy of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 H v.L. REv.
11 89 (1987).
4. See, eg., JosmH RAz, THE AuTroprrv oF Law: Essays ON LAw Am MoRAx'rv 210-29
(1979).
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issue from a source which, in the relevant society, generally is
seen as a good and proper source for making such rules.' This
Article measures against these two values four methods of constitutional interpretation that are sometimes advanced as originalist. I call these methods (1) original text; (2) original intentions;
(3) original understanding; and (4) original values. My conclusion is that the second, the method of original intentions adjudication, is most consistent with these originalist values.
(1) Oiginal Text. This method holds that the Constitution is
properly interpreted as any set of rules consistent with the dictionary meaning (at the time of interpretation) of the words of
the constitutional text.' The meaning chosen need not be the
same meaning that those words were intended to carry by the
enactors of the relevant constitutional text.
With respect to the criterion of certainty, the original text
method does limit the application of the Constitution to meanings that are available from a mere inspection of the text. But, in
the very common situation in which more than one meaning is
reasonably attributable to the text, this approach introduces an
inevitable element of uncertainty because, by hypothesis, each of
the meanings satisfies fully the interpretative requirements; one
cannot predict what the Constitution will and will not permit.
More importantly, however, this kind of interpretation
presents an acute problem of legitimacy. The value of legitimacy
concerns the political basis on which the Constitution claims
obedience as supreme law. This must have something to do with
the historical political process by which the text of the Constitution was created-with the people and processes involved in writing and ratifying it. Creating the Constitution was an essentially
political act and it is the historical and political circumstances of
that act that invested it with the legitimacy that made it law.7 The
method of original text, by definition, makes those circumstances irrelevant to the formulation of constitutional meaning.
(2) OriginalIntentions. This technique holds that the Constitution is properly interpreted as that set of rules intended to be
5. SeeRichard S. Kay, The Creationof Canstitutionsin Canadaand the United States, 7 CAN.U.S. LJ. 111, 116, 120-21 (1984).
6. See Frederick Schauer, An Essay on ConstitutionalLanguage, 29 UCLA L. Rav. 797,
804-12, 831 (1982).
7. See Richard S. Kay, OriginalIntentions, StandardMeanings,and the Legal Characterof the
Constitution, 6 CoNsT. CoMMEwamw 39, 44-45 (1989).
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created by the Constitution-makers at the time of enactment.'
This understanding is so conventional, and so firmly rooted in
American judicial practice, that it used to be called simply constitutional interpretation.
With regard to certainty, the technique of original intentions
has the potential to produce rules that are relatively clear and stable because the rules that it aims to apply are, definitionally,
fixed at a specific time-the time the Constitution-makers engaged in the purposive act of creating the Constitution. Moreover, at least when applied in the context of litigated cases, the
method points the judge to the meaning that is more likely to
conform to the intentions of the enactors, even when each of the
competing meanings might be consistent with the language of
the relevant text considered by itself.
Interpretation according to the original intentions is also consistent with the criterion of legitimacy. By adhering to that rule
that was intentionally created by the people whose actions created the Constitution, a judge gives due deference to that political judgment. I believe the drafting, ratification, and
amendment of the 1787-89 Constitution continue to be seen as
events that express the will of a properly empowered American
"people" to set and define the character and limits of the polity.
The constitutional Founders still seem to enjoy a regard, if not
reverence, that has not significantly diminished over time, an attitude evidenced in popular culture, as well as in Supreme Court
opinions.
(3) OriginalUnderstanding.This model holds that the Constitution is properly regarded as any set of rules consistent with the
dictionary definition of the words of the relevant text at the time
the text was enacted and that are plausible in light of the historical
context in which the Constitution was enacted.' It thus differs
from the "original text" version by focusing on the objective circumstances in which the text was written and from the "original
intentions" version by eschewing reliance upon the supposed
subjective intentions of the enactors of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding this distinction, in practice the "original understanding" and "original intentions" methods are quite similar.
When people use certain words they probably intend to commu8. I have elaborated this model more fully in Kay, supranote 2, at 230.
9. See Boan, supra note 2, at 144; Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 CoLum. L. REv. 723, 725-26 (1988).
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nicate the meaning which people, in general, in that time and
place, and dealing with that kind of problem, would intend in
employing that language. That is, the objective meaning, qualified this way, and the subjectively intended meaning almost always will be identical. This identity is particularly likely in the
case of the United States Constitution of 1787-89. The relevant
actors were not the actual drafters of the language, but the members of the ratifying conventions that gave it the force of law.
Their subjective intentions are even more likely to coincide with
the meaning of the text that would have been generally understood at the time. 10
Consequently, original understanding almost always will yield
the same results as will original intentions. The relative appeal of
these two approaches, therefore, turns on the superiority of one
or the other in those rare cases in which they produce different
interpretations, that is, when the application of the original understanding will result in a meaning that was not intended by the
Constitution-makers. Choosing the original understanding in
such a case, therefore, raises exactly the same issues of legitimacy
that were associated with the original text alternative.
In disagreeing with both the original text and original understanding techniques, I have suggested that legitimacy concerns
may oblige us to choose a constitutional meaning that was intended by the enactors, even when that meaning was not inferable from an examination of the text, either on its face or in the
context of the time of enactment. Fidelity to the original intentions thus may appear to require application of a hidden or secret rule, a result that is squarely at odds with the originalist
criterion of certainty.
As an abstract matter, this objection has undeniable force.
When expressions and intentions do not match, the objective of
clear, knowable rules is in necessary tension with the goal of submission to the authority of legitimate lawmakers. In practice,
however, adherence to the intended meaning rarely will lead to
application of an unknowable rule. That is because it supposes a
case in which people express their intentions in patently inapt
words." Communication by words often is difficult but usually is
10. For these reasons, the first and principal source for determining the original intentions under the second technique will be an examination of the original understanding.
11. I am speaking here of situations in which the language fails to give a fairly clear
notice of the character of the legal rule. I am not concerned about the case of language,
the meaning ofwhich is doubtful only in marginal situations. This problem, that ofvague-
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possible, particularly when people take care in choosing their
language and debate and discuss the phrases they will employ, as
they do in legislative and constitutional drafting.
When the actors do fail to employ words that comport with
their intentions, the problem usually involves a discrete drafting
error that is readily apparent to the reader. Thus, when the Arkansas legislature provided that "all laws and parts of laws, and
particularly Act 311 of the Acts of 1941, are hereby repealed,"
although its language failed to express its true intention, that fact
was rather obvious. When the Supreme Court of Arkansas held
that the law should be applied only to laws in conflict with the
12
relevant statute, the court was hardly imposing a surprise rule.
(4) OriginalValues. This model holds that the Constitution is to
be interpreted as something other than a finite set of rules. It
calls for the Constitution to be "invoked" in litigated cases when
a court holds invalid some action of government that it deems in
conflict with the more or less general substantive values that were
sought to be advanced by the enactors of the Constitution. This
technique involves a relatively unconstrained approach to judicial review. 13
Honestly applied, this model may well satisfy the criterion of
legitimacy. This is because the determining factors of decisions
are attributable, in a general way, to the Constitution-makers
whose values are being interpreted and applied, and, as I have
argued, their will is the most plausible source of legitimate constitutional law.
This method of constitutional "interpretation," however, fails
the certainty criterion. To distinguish this approach from original intentions, the governing values must be taken at a level of
generality broaderthan that understood to have been intended by
the constitutional enactors. 14 Values defined at that level of generality may reasonably support inconsistent decisions on the conness due to the open texture of language, is well known, see H.L.A. HART,THE CoNCEPT OF
LAw 123, 128-36 (2d ed. 1994), and is unavoidable in any employment of language. That
ubiquitous feature of linguistic communication cannot reasonably be characterized as
creating an issue of hidden or secret rules.
12. Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 201 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Ark. 1947).
13. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Forum of Prindpk, 56 N.Y.U. L.Rav. 469, 472-76
(1981).
14. Those who claim that the enactors themselves intended only to specify values at a
high level of generality and that the specification of those values was to be entrusted to
the judges are arguing on the basis of the model of original intentions. See e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalInten4 98 HAv. L. Rav. 885 (1985). My
disagreement with these writers is on a matter of history, not theory.

HarvardJournal of Law & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 19

stitutionality of the same action. Thus, if the Fourteenth
Amendment is understood effectively to prohibit unjustified state
interference with "liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,""' 5 the Constitution, in this respect,
provides no firmer ground for predicting the permissible limits
of governmental behavior than is available from an informed estimate of the likely political behavior of the legislature.
Of the four possibilities listed, the model of original intentions
comes closest to satisfying the objectives of constitutional government that seem to matter most to originalists. It is important,
however, to emphasize the limits of this argument. Most importantly, I have discussed these methods only in light of the two
"originalist" values noted. But there are, of course, other values
at stake as well. Most importantly, I have not addressed the relevance of the substantive contents of the constitutional rules that
might be derived from one or another of the methods of interpretation mentioned. Instead, I have used the term legitimacy
solely in connection with the presence or absence of an acceptable source from which the rules issue. One also might insist,
however, that no constitutional rule is legitimate if its application
leads to consequences that are seriously out of touch with prevailing political and social values of the society in which it is
applied. 6
These two senses of legitimacy obviously are related. A society
usually will regard the rules that issue from a legitimate source as
substantively legitimate because the things it values in the source
are manifest in the contents of the rules created by that source. If
a society were to display a kind of split personality, whereby it
continued to esteem a certain constitution-making process but
despised the rules that process intended to generate, the model
of original intentions, although most faithful to originalist values,
still could be criticized as incapable of producing suitable constitutional rules for that society.
Whether this state of affairs exists is a matter of empirical inquiry. In the United States, that inquiry may be framed as
whether, notwithstanding the continuing political veneration of
the constitutional founding, the rules intentionally generated in
that process would be politically unacceptable if they were faith15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
16. See Kay, supra note 2, at 156-58.
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fully applied by the courts. Without entering into the merits of
that contention, I think it presents, at least, a genuine question
about the long-term viability of written constitutions.
That matter, however, is beyond the present point. Assuming
that the rules intentionally created by Constitution-makers meet
some minimal level of political acceptability (not that they are the
best possible rules for a given society), people who value political
legitimacy and certainty and stability, those who value the peculiar virtues of constitutional government, will be drawn
powerfully to constitutional interpretation that seeks the original
intentions of the Constitution-makers.

